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Commentary
TAKING DIALOGUE THEORY MUCH
TOO SERIOUSLY (OR PERHAPS
CHARTER DIALOGUE ISN'T SUCH A
GOOD THING AFTER ALL)©
ANDREW PETTER
This article challenges the thesis of Peter W. Hogg,
Allison A. Bushell Thornton, and Wade K. Wright
(put forth earlier in this issue) that the frequency of
legislative responses to Charterdecisions striking down
laws, which they refer to as "Charter dialogue,"
provides evidence that Canada has a weaker form of.
judicial review than is thought to exist in the United
States. This article also critiques their claim that
judicial review is justified by the idea that individuals
have rights that cannot be taken away by an appeal to
the general welfare'. The author maintains that this
claim not only contradicts their previous arguments,
but also undermines their position that Charter
dialogue, insofar as it allows legislatures to reassert
majoritarian objectives following adverse court
decisions, is a good thing.

Cet article interpelle la these de Peter W. Hogg,
Allison A. Bushell Thornton et Wade K. Wright
(6voqu6e plus haut dans ce num6ro), selon laquelle la
fr6quence des r6ponses 16gislatives aux decisions
relatives A Ia Charte qui" abrogent certaines lois,
d6cisions auxquelles ils font allusion sous l'expression
.Dialogue de la Charteo, d6montre que le Canada
dispose d'une forme de revision judiciaire plus faible
que celle qu'on attribuc aux Etats-Unis. L'article
critique aussi leur pr6tention selon laquelle la r6vision
judiciaire se justifie par l'id6e voulant que les
particuliers disposent de droits que ne peut pas ali6ner
un appel A l'int6r&t g~n~ral. L'auteur maintient que
cette pr6tention ne fait pas que contredire leurs
arguments pr6c6dents, mais 6branle aussi leur position
scion laquelle le dialogue de la Charteest souhaitable
- tant qu'il permet aux l6gislatures de r6affirmer des
objectifs majoritaires suivant des arrts adverses des
tribunaux.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In their original article on Charter dialogue, Peter Hogg and
Allison Bushell maintained that certain structural features of the
CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms' give legislatures the capacity
to respond to court decisions that invalidate laws by enacting modified
laws accomplishing the same legislative objectives.2 According to the
authors, this capacity "greatly diminished" any concern about the
legitimacy of judicial review because it showed that Charter decisions
are not a major obstacle to democratic decision making.3 They argued
that this diminished concern was justified despite the high degree of
discretion exercised by courts in interpreting the Charter,which they
acknowledged "inevitably remakes the constitution into the likeness
favoured by the judges."4
My initial response to this thesis was mixed.' On the one hand, I
applauded the authors' acknowledgement of the subjective nature of
Charterdecision making and, in light of this, their willingness to reject
traditional defences of judicial review based upon the rule of law. I also
welcomed their use of democracy as the yardstick of constitutional
legitimacy, their acceptance of legislative engagement on rights issues,
and their support for legislative supremacy in relation to matters of
social and economic policy. Finally, I saw some benefit in the potential
of the thesis to encourage judges to lessen their attachment to liberal

Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
2 Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 [" CharterDialogue"].
3Ibid.at 80.
4 Ibid.at 77.
' Andrew Petter, "Twenty Years of Charter Justification: From Liberal Legalism to
Dubious Dialogue" (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 187 [Petter, "CharterJustification"]; Andrew Petter, "Rip
Van Winkle in Charterland" (2005) 63 Advocate (B.C.) 337.
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legalism, and to edge away from the regressive assumptions that
animated Charterjurisprudence in the 1980s.
Other aspects of the thesis, however, I found problematic. First,
I observed that the thesis was devoid of normative content and exerted
no moral claim to support or guide the involvement of judges in Charter
decision making. It applied to any and all Charter interpretations,
offering reassurance on the basis that, no matter what judges decided,
legislatures could find ways to reassert their policy objectives. For this
reason, I argued that the thesis at best mitigated, rather than
legitimated, the courts' role under the Charter.Second, I maintained
that the thesis seriously underestimated the extent to which judicial
decision making under the" Charterinfluences public policy in Canada.
This it did by: discounting the privileged position that courts occupy in
Charter dialogues; treating 'all legislative responses to court decisions
alike, without regard to the extent to which those responses maintained
the legislatures' policy objectives; and ignoring the extent to which
judicial interpretations of Charter rights permeate public discourse,
drive policy decisions, and influence every aspect of political life.
Finally, I saw disturbing implications for democracy in the fact that
Canadian constitutional scholars had no difficulty advancing a thesis
that both acknowledged the political nature of judicial review and
defended its legitimacy.
I was not alone in pointing out problems and deficiencies in the
arguments concerning Charter dialogue presented by Hogg and
Bushell.6 Not surprisingly, however, these shortcomings did not
discourage the courts and some Charterenthusiasts from embracing a
thesis that purported to legitimize the role of judges while placing no

6 See e.g. F.L. Morton, "Dialogue or Monologue?" (April 1999) 20 Policy Options 23;
Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and
Bushell" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513; Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Dialogue,
Deference and Restraint: Judicial Independence and Trial Procedures" (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev.
323; Jeremy Webber, "Institutional Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures in the Definition of
Fundamental Rights: Lessons from Canada (and elsewhere)" in Wojciech Sadurski, ed.,
ConstitutionalJustice, East and West: Democratic Legitimacy and ConstitutionalCourts in PostCommunist Europe in a ComparativePerspective (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 61
[Webber, "Institutional Dialogue"]; Keith Ewing, "Human Rights" in Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet,
eds., The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 309; Mark
Tushnet, "Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World" (2003) 53 U.T.L.J. 89; Rainer
Knopff, "How Democratic is the Chartei9 And Does It Matter?" (2003) 19 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d)
199; and Allan C. Hutchinson, "Judges and Politics: An Essay from Canada" (2004) 24 L.S. 275.
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constraints on their decision-making authority.7 Therefore, what might
properly have been regarded as a modest case for moderating concerns
about the undemocratic effects of Charterdecisions has been invoked
by judges and scholars over the past decade as though it represented a
full-fledged theory of judicial review. Moreover, while the thesis
advanced by Hogg and Bushell in 1997 implicitly spoke to the
desirability of judges showing deference to the policy-making role of
legislatures, the thesis has since been harnessed by some courts and
commentators to justify more, not less, judicial activism. 8
The return in this issue of Hogg, Bushell, and a new co-author,
to the debate on Charter dialogue provided them an opportunity to
reinforce the limitations of their original thesis, to correct some of its
deficiencies, and to repudiate its misapplication by courts and scholars.9
Unfortunately, they have for the most part gone in the opposite
direction, abandoning some of the limitations of their original thesis,
adding to its deficiencies, and encouraging its judicial and academic
misuse. In short, like so many others, they have fallen prey to the
temptation to take dialogue theory much too seriously.
In this response, I do not propose to repeat all of the criticisms
that I have advanced previously. Instead I intend to focus on two
propositions that are central to the revised thesis presented by the
authors in this issue:
1. That the structural features of the Charter, particularly the
reasonable limits clause found in section 1, result in a weaker
form of judicial review that provides legislatures with a broader
scope to pursue their policy objectives than would otherwise be
the case; and

'The Supreme Court of Canada embraced the dialogue thesis in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998]
1 S.C.R. 493 [ Vriena]. For examples of academic support for the thesis, see Patrick J. Monahan,
"The Supreme Court of Canada in the 21st Century" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 374; Kent Roach,
The Supreme Court on Trial: JudicialActivism or DemocraticDialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2001).
'See e.g. Vriend, ibid.; Roach, ibid.For discussion of how dialogue theory can encourage
courts to become more activist, see Andrew Petter, "Wealthcare: The Politics of the Charter
Revisited" in Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to
Justice The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2005) 116 at 128-31.
I Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue
Revisited-Or 'Much Ado About Metaphors' (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 ["CharterDialogue
Revisited"].
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2. That the capacity of legislatures to respond to court decisions
under the Charter, while not justifying judicial review,
significantly diminishes concerns about the legitimacy of judicial
review.
I contend that neither of these propositions is sustainable.
II.

A WEAKER FORM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (OR NOT)

The thesis presented by Hogg and Bushell in 1997 was
predicated on the claim that Canada has a weaker form of judicial
review than is thought to exist in the United States, where "the antimajoritarian objection to judicial review could not be ignored."'" The
reason for this, according to the authors, is that the Chartercontains
features that enable legislatures to respond to court decisions
invalidating legislation, and thereby continue to pursue their policy
objectives, albeit in different ways. The authors identified four such
features, the most significant of which is the reasonable limits clause in
section 1. They supported this claim by identifying sixty-six Charter
cases in which a law had been held to be invalid by the Supreme Court
of Canada or lower courts, and by showing that 80 per cent of these
cases had triggered some legislative response." They held these data out
as evidence of dialogue and support for their claim that the Charter
established a weaker form of judicial review.
In their most recent article, "CharterDialogue Revisited," Hogg
and his co-authors, Allison A. Bushell Thornton and Wade K. Wright
("the authdrs"), reassert this claim in succinct and definitive terms:
In 1997, the literature on judicial review was predominantly American, and the Canadian
contributions naturally drew inspiration from the American literature. Most Canadian
writers assumed a "strong form" of judicial review, under which courts usually have the
last word. Our study made clear that in Canada we had a weaker form of judicial review
that rarely had the effect of actually defeating the purpose of the legislative body.' 2

They also update their data to show that, of the twenty-three Supreme
Court of Canada cases since their 1997 article in which a law was held to

'oSupra note 2 at 77.
nIbid.at 97.
'2 Supra note 9 at 4.
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be invalid under the Charter, 61 per cent elicited some legislative
response.13
How persuasive is the claim of the authors that this level of
legislative response is evidence that section 1 and other Charterfeatures
have produced a weaker form of judicial review in Canada? The answer,
unfortunately, is that it is not at all persuasive. There are various reasons
for this, but chief amongst them are: (i) their focus on quantitative
rather than qualitative analysis of Charter decisions and legislative
responses; (ii) their inattention to the extent and nature of
constitutional dialogues in the United States; and (iii) their failure to
consider the significance of legislatures' lack of use of the override
clause in section 33.
A.

The Importance of OualitativeAnalysis

Let us turn first to the authors' focus on quantitative rather than
qualitative analysis of Charter decisions and legislative responses.
According to the authors, any legislative response to a Charterdecision
invalidating a law is evidence of dialogue. Thus, their count of legislative
responses over the two periods they surveyed includes eight cases in
which the legislature simply repealed the laws found to be
unconstitutional by the courts, and several others in which the
legislature "merely implemented the changes the reviewing court had
suggested."14 These cases were included, they said, because it would cast
the notion of dialogue "too narrowly to discount those remedial
measures that have merely followed the directions of the court, either by
repealing or amending an unconstitutional law." 5 Whether or not one
finds this explanation convincing, what it reveals is that the presence of
Charter dialogue, as defined by the authors, is no indication of the
strength of judicial review. Such strength can be measured only by
attending to the nature as well as the number of legislative responses.
To demonstrate this point, consider a situation in which every
Charter decision declaring a law to be invalid resulted only in a
subsequent repeal of that law or other amendment required by the
court. Under Hogg and Bushell's definition of dialogue, this situation
' 3 ibid.at 51.
' 4 Supra note 2 at 98.
' 5 Ibid.
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would constitute a 100 per cent rate of dialogue. Yet by no stretch of the
imagination could it be said that this situation provided evidence of a
weak form of judicial review. On the contrary, the fact that legislatures
in this example gave effect to the judgments of the court in each and
every case would suggest an incredibly strong and effective form of
judicial review.
There is, in other words, nothing remarkable or revealing about
the fact that legislatures respond to judicial decisions that strike down
laws. Indeed, given that legislative responses are often required to give
effect to such decisions, and to accommodate their impacts upon other
aspects of legislative schemes, it would be more remarkable if
legislatures did not respond. In assessing the strength of judicial review,
therefore, it is necessary to consider the degree to which Charterrulings
that strike down laws enable legislatures to achieve their original policy.
objectives. The only way this can be assessed is through a comprehensive
qualitative analysis of the cases-one that evaluates the substance of the
court rulings, their impact upon the legislatures' policy objectives, and
the extent to which legislative responses were successful in overcoming,
as opposed to accommodating, these impacts. Qualitative analysis is also
required to identify the secondary impacts of judicial decisions upon
legislative policy, as well as the extent to which Charterdecisions may
affect other government policies and future policy making.
The value of qualitative analysis is illustrated by examining the
16
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Schachter v. Canada.
The
Court in that case confirmed a ruling of the federal court that it was a
contravention of the guarantee of equality rights in section 15(1) of the
Charterto deny biological parents access to benefits that were available
to adoptive parents under the Unemployment InsuranceAct.17 This left
Parliament with the choice of either increasing benefits for biological
parents or decreasing them for adoptive parents. Parliament's response,
tabled in 1989 as part of Bill C-21 following the federal court's decision
and enacted in 1990, was to do both, making such benefits available to
all parents for ten weeks, rather than for the fifteen weeks that adoptive

16

[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 [Schachtej.

Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 30, as am. by S.C.
1980-81-82-83, c. 150, s. 4, 32(1), as am. by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 150, s. 5.
17
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parents had previously enjoyed.18 Hogg and Bushell chalk this up as
another example of Charterdialogue, noting that "[s]ection 15(1) leaves
room for different legislative choices of this kind, such that
democratically elected bodies are still ultimately responsible for setting
their own budgetary priorities, albeit in a way that does not discriminate
against disadvantaged groups."19 This rosy assessment discounts the
extent to which Parliament's response to Schachter required it to
deviate from its original policy objectives, both by reducing the duration
of benefits made available to adoptive parents, and by giving biological
parents access to benefits that it had not previously provided them.2"
Not only did this response represent a major alteration in the statutory
scheme, it also required a substantial expenditure of funds that had not
21
previously been authorized by Parliament.

18 An Act to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Employment and
ImmigrationDepartmentandCommission Act, S.C. 1990, c. 40, s. 24.

19

Supra note 2 at 91.
The frustration felt by Members of Parliament concerning the choice they were forced to
make between decreasing benefits for adoptive parents and increasing benefits for biological
parents was evident during committee hearings on Bill C-21. Here, for example, is what Barbara
McDougall, the Employment and Immigration Minister at that time, said during those hearings
when responding to pleas from a government MP that some way be found to restore the benefit for
adoptive parents to fifteen weeks:
I am very sensitive to the situation of adoptive parents. We gave considerable thought to
this problem when the Bill was being drafted. The problem still exist. [sic] In fact, there
are two problems. There is the problem of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that
regarding the situation of natural parents and adoptive parents. In addition, the system is
open and much more costly. We are trying to find a solution.
Before my appearance here today, I had not found a solution. I am sorry, but that is
simply the case....
House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedingsand Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C21, 34th Parl., No. 19 (3 October 1989) at 19:31 [English translation] [Minutes].
21 It is worth noting that a principal reason given by the Supreme Court of Canada for
deciding to remedy the Charterviolation by striking down the benefit provided to adoptive parents,
rather than extending it to biological parents, was that the costs of such an extension would
constitute an intrusion into the legislative domain "substantial enough to change potentially the
nature of the scheme as a whole." Schachter,supra note 16 at 723. To the same effect, Hogg, in his
constitutional textbook, says that the "remedy of extension directly alters the statutory scheme and
requires new expenditures by the federal government that have never been authorized by
Parliament," noting that "a court faced with an under-inclusive statute has an unpalatable choice
between the draconian remedy of nullification and the radical remedy of extension." Peter W.
Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,student ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2006) at 900 [Hogg,
ConstitutionalLaw,2006]. Apparently it is his view that the "unpalatable choice" that a court faces
in such situations becomes a gourmet exercise in democracy when imposed upon legislatures.

2007]

Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously

Yet these are only the direct consequences of the decision. In
the zero-sum world of public finance, the five hundred million dollars in
new costs imposed upon the unemployment insurance (uI) program as a
result of this response and Parliament's response to Thtrault-Gadouryv.
22 in which
Canada,
the Court ordered that Ul benefits be extended to
those who are sixty-five years of age and older, impelled the government
to seek further savings within the U1 system.2 3 Such savings were
achieved through additional legislative amendments increasing the
number of work weeks required to qualify for UI benefits, reducing the
number of weeks for which U1 benefits are provided, and toughening the
penalties for workers who leave their jobs without cause, refuse a
suitable job, or are dismissed for misconduct.2 4 These amendments
resulted in at least thirty thousand people losing uI benefits, with
female, immigrant, elderly, and disabled workers being the hardest hit.'
These are not minor policy consequences. On the contrary, they are
changes that influenced and continue to influence the lives of thousands
of Canadians.
What this qualitative analysis reveals-and what quantitative
analysis cannot-are the significant first- and second-order impacts that
Schachter and Tdtrault-Gadouy had upon public policy in Canada.
Moreover, it is safe to assume that their impacts were even more farreaching than this, as governments across Canada reviewed and revised
other statutory schemes in light of these rulings and incorporated them
into their analysis of new legislative initiatives.2 6 Yet the authors

22[1991] 2 S.C.R. 22 [ Ttrault-Gadouy].
2

Joel Bakan, Just Words: ConstitutionalRights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University

of Toronto Press, 1997) at 59.
24

Supranote 18.

2 Supra note 23.
26 The federal Department of Justice, for example, "routinely reviews new legislation for
potential Charter violations" by trying "to gauge the courts' likely response to legislation, based on
existing case law." Matthew A. Hennigar, "Expanding the 'Dialogue' Debate: Canadian Federal
Government Responses to Lower Court Charter Decisions" (2004) 37 Can. J. of-Pol. Sci. 3 at 16-17.
Similar reviews take place within all provincial governments. A sense of how this process influences
policy-making can be gleaned from the following remarks of Jean-Pierre Blackburn, MP, during the
debate on Bill C-21:
When we, as members of Parliament, want to introduce amendments, we feel there is
always something hanging over our heads: namely the famous rule that our amendment
may run counter to the Charter. I find this rather disturbing. It is like a form of
blackmail. As soon as a member tries to move an amendment, he or she is told that it
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minimize the importance of such qualitative analysis. While referring to
the substance of some judicial decisions and statutory sequels to
illustrate their argument, they insist that all legislative responses,
regardless of whether they accommodate or overcome court rulings, are
evidence of dialogue.27 To the same effect, they maintain that judicial
review can be characterized as "weak," even though it exerts
"considerable judicial influence on the legislative process,"28 and dismiss

suggestions that resulting policy distortions raise serious questions
concerning the legitimacy of that influence.
While the dialogue thesis advanced by the authors relies upon
quantitative rather than qualitative analysis of Charter cases to measure
their impact on legislative policy, qualitative analysis of Charter cases
abounds in Canadian constitutional scholarship. One of Canada's
leading constitutional scholars, for example, has drawn upon his
extensive qualitative analysis of Chartercases (albeit focused more on

judicial decisions than on legislative responses) to reach the following
conclusion concerning the impact of section 1:
During the public debate that preceded the adoption of the Charter, there was
controversy about the desirability of a limitation clause, the conventional view being that
the clause "weakened" the Charter.But s.1 has probably had the effect of strengthening
the guaranteed rights. [Section 1] has been interpreted as imposing stringent
requirements of justification. Those requirements may be more difficult for the
government to discharge than the requirements that would have been imposed by the
courts in the absence of a limitation clause.

may not be in keeping with the Charter. This fear prevents us from working in the
interest of all Canadians.
Minutes, supra note 20.
2
It is interesting to observe in this regard that if the authors did nothing more than classify
legislative responses confined to repealing laws struck down by courts, together with legislative nonresponses, as examples of "acquiescence" rather than of "dialogue," their analysis would show that
legislatures acquiesced to court rulings in 34 per cent (30 of 88) of all the Chartercases they
surveyed, and in 43 per cent (10 of 23) of the recent Chartercases they surveyed in their second
article. It appears difficult to reconcile this substantial and growing rate of legislative acquiescence
with the view that judicial review is a weak influence on legislative decision making in Canada. This
is particularly so given that such cases do not include those such as A.G. (Oue.) v. Quebec
ProtestantSchool Boards,[1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, and Baron v.Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416, in which
legislatures merely implemented legislative changes recommended by the courts, nor those like
Schachter,supra note 16, and Tdtrault-Gadoury,supra note 22, in which legislatures were impelled
by Charterrulingsto undertake other major changes in legislative policy.
2
Supra note 9 at 39.

2007]

Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously

This assessment challenges a central tenet of the dialogue thesis
presented by the authors, namely that section 1 of the Charter has
resulted in a weaker form of judicial review. Yet nowhere do they
mention this assessment, let alone answer it. This omission is
extraordinary given that the constitutional scholar whose qualitative
analysis led to this contrary view is none other than Peter Hogg, in a
passage penned in 19929 and repeated in the 2006 edition of his
constitutional law treatise.3"
So which Peter Hogg are we to believe? Is it the Peter Hogg who
argued in "Charter Dialogue" and "Charter Dialogue Revisited" that
section 1 weakened judicial review under the Charte Or is it the Peter
Hogg who argued in his book, Constitutional Law of Canada, that
section 1 probably strengthened judicial review under the Charter?.It is
difficult to say. What one can say, however, is that the qualitative
analysis of the cases engaged in by the latter Peter Hogg provides a
stronger basis on which to make such an assessment than the
predominantly quantitative analysis of the cases employed by the former
Peter Hogg.3
B.

Lessons on Dialoguefrom the UnitedStates

Even if one were to accept the flawed proposition that Charter
dialogues, as defined by Hogg and Bushell, provide evidence of a
weaker form of judicial review, this would not justify the conclusion that
Canadian judicial review is so weak that it can escape the legitimacy
debate that they acknowledge "could not be ignored" in the United
States.3 2 To support this conclusion, one would need to examine the
extent to which legislatures in the United States have been able to
respond to constitutional rulings in which laws are struck down by
courts. It is true that the U.S. Constitution does not contain an express
limitation clause like section 1 of the Charter, but as Hogg
acknowledges in the above passage from his treatise, the absence of such
29 Peter W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, student ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell,

1992) at 853.
3
°Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw, 2006, supranote 21 at 827.
1 The qualitative analysis of Charter cases in Hogg's textbook would provide an even
stronger basis for such an assessment if it devoted as much attention to legislative responses as it
does to the judicial decisions themselves.
2
Supra note 2 at 77.
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a clause does not prevent the courts from routinely reading limitations
into the constitutional rights themselves. Indeed, as Hogg also points
out in his treatise, the proportionality test adopted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes3 to give meaning to'section i of the
Charter "bears striking similarities" to the test articulated six years
earlier in relation to commercial. expression by the U.S. Supreme
Court.34 Nor is the use of such "means-ends" tests rare in American
jurisprudence. On the contrary, judicial scrutiny of means-ends
relationships "may well be the most frequently invoked technique in the
judicial review of the validity of federal and state legislation."3 5
In order to sustain the argument that Canadian judicial review is
significantly weaker than its American counterpart, therefore, serious
attention must be given to the existence of constitutional dialogues in
the United States. Incredibly, other than a footnote in their first article
referring to "conceptions of 'dialogue' in the American literature,3 6 the
authors neglect to do this.37 This is made even more remarkable by the
fact that dialogue was identified as a "central motif" in American
constitutional scholarship well before the concept was introduced into
the Canadian constitutional lexicon.38 The following characterization of
judicial review in the United States, taken from Barry Friedman's 1993
essay, "Dialogue and Judicial Review," could just as easily have come
from Hogg and Bushell's article on the Canadian Charterpublished four
years later:

-3 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
' Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw,2006, supra note 21 at 827, n. 4a.
'5 Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, ConstitutionalLaw, 13th ed. (Westbury, NY:
The Foundation Press, 1997) at 108, n. 2.
36

Supra note 2 at 79, n. 12.

"z Although in a separate article written on his own in 2004, Hogg acknowledges that
legislative sequels undoubtedly occur in the United States and that judicial review in that country
may not be as strong as is sometimes supposed: Peter W. Hogg, "Discovering Dialogue" (2004) 23
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 3 at 4 [Hogg, "Discovering Dialogue"].
38 Stanley Ingber, "Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the
Demise of Dialogue" (1994) 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 1473 at 1479, n. 10. Examples of other recent
American scholarship discussing the existence of constitutional dialogues in the United States
include the following: Louis Fisher, ConstitutionalDialogues: Interpretationas PoliticalProcess
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Barry Friedman, "Dialogue and Judicial Review"
(1993) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577; and Dan T. Coenen, "A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting
Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue" (2001) 42 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1575.
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I call the process of judicial review that actually occurs in the workaday world dialogue.
The term emphasizes that judicial review is significantly more interdependent and
interactive than generally described. The Constitution is not interpreted by aloof judges
imposing their will on the people. Rather, constitutional interpretation is an elaborate
discussion between judges and the body politic. 9

Similar views have also been voiced by members of the
American judiciary, such as this excerpt from a speech delivered in 1993
by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: "[J]udges play an interdependent part
in our democracy. They do not alone shape legal doctrine but ... they
participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the
people as well."4
What conclusions can be drawn from the American scholarship
concerning constitutional dialogue? Above all, such scholarship provides
strong support for the view, acknowledged by Hogg in his treatise, but
overlooked in these articles on dialogue, that the existence or absence of
an express limitation clause does not determine the extent to which
judicial decisions are influential or conclusive. The U.S. Supreme Court
has developed what Harry H. Wellington has referred to as "a whole
family of procedural or structural doctrines" that allow the Court to say
to other governmental entities: "You may be able to achieve the
substantive result you desire, but you must proceed toward your
objective in a different fashion from the one you have used."'"
The extent and impact of such structural doctrines have been
exhaustively examined in Dan Coenen's recent study, "A Constitution of
Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules
of Interbranch Dialogue."4 Coenen documents nine structural doctrines
(many with multiple sub-categories) through which the U.S. Supreme
Court "initiates a7 dialogue with and among non-judicial actors, often
deferring to decisions of political branches on how to resolve
constitutional issues, so long as those decisions bear the earmarks of
deliberation and care."43 He also identifies three "quasi-structural rules"
and four "quasi-structural tools" that facilitate inter-branch dialogue.
39

Friedman, ibid.at 653.
I Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "Speaking in a Judicial Voice" (1992) 67 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1185 at

1198.
"1 Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution The Supreme Court and the Process
ofAdjudication (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) at 35.
42
Coenen, supra note 38.
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Ibid. at 1583.
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Coenen's study shows such doctrines to be so pervasive that, based on its
findings, Mark Tushnet has questioned whether the United States
"could get along quite well with subconstitutional doctrine and no
substantive judicial review." '
In sum, there is strong evidence in the United States, as in
Canada, that constitutional decision making by the courts frequently
produces "dialogues" with other branches of government. Indeed, the
structural and quasi-structural devices that Coenen identifies as
facilitating dialogue in the United States are more numerous than the
Charter devices identified by the authors. This does not mean that
constitutional dialogues occur more frequently in the United States
(though there is no reason to assume that they do not, particularly if the
definition of dialogue includes legislative responses acquiescing to court.
decisions). What it does mean, however, is that if the authors wish to
make the case that Canada enjoys a weaker form of judicial review, they
need to undertake a comprehensive qualitative assessment of judicial
decisions and legislative responses in both countries.
Another point that emerges clearly in the American literature is
the importance of distinguishing amongst opportunities for dialogue on
the basis that some pose more serious obstacles than others for the
attainment of governmental objectives." Unlike the authors, American
scholars accept that assessing the significance of dialogues requires one
to attend to the nature as well as the frequency of legislative. responses,
the influence of the courts in shaping those responses, and the degree to
which such responses involve policy compromises and deviations from
legislative goals. As a result, American scholars are not prone to
speaking of constitutional dialogues as answering anti-majoritarian
criticisms of judicial review. Rather, they understand that, while the
existence of such dialogues may influence debates over the legitimacy of
judicial review, it in no way resolves them.46

' Mark Tushnet, "Subconstitutional Constitutional Law:
Substitute?" (2001) 42 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1871 at 1880.

Supplement,

Sham,. or

' Supra note 41 at 36. See also the debate between Professors Tushnet and Coenen as to
whether judges take advantage of such obstacles to drive substantive outcomes by means of
structural decisions: Tushnet, ibid.; Dan T. Coenen, "Structural Review, Pseudo-Second-Look
Decision Making, and the Risk of Diluting Constitutional Liberty" (2001) 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1881.
46
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C.

The Significance of the Insignificance of Section 33

One feature of the Canadian Charter that has no explicit or
implicit counterpart in the U.S. Constitution is section 33, which allows
legislatures to override Charterdecisions by including a notwithstanding
clause in statutes. The authors refer to section 33 as one of the
structural features of the Charterthat enables dialogue, and invoke it to
support their claim that legislatures have the last word even where a
legislative objective is held to be unconstitutional. However, the section
does not feature prominently in their analysis. The reason they give is
that the section in practice "has become relatively unimportant, because
of the development of a political climate of resistance to its use.""
I agree that the political climate in Canada has rendered the use
of section 33 insignificant. However, this is not true of its non-use. The
relative strength or weakness of judicial review, after all, is a function of
political as well as textual opportunities and constraints. Like Sherlock
Holmes' famous clue of the dog that did not bark,4 8 the failure of
legislatures to invoke section 33 speaks volumes. Given that section 33
was part of the original Charter bargain, the degree of political
resistance that has built up to its use provides a powerful indicator of the
dominance of legalism over democracy in the realm, of Charterdecision
making.49 Thus while legislatures have de jure powers to override courts
under section 33, the political inability of legislatures to exercise such
powers gives courts de facto final say over the constitutional
acceptability of legislative objectives. Moreover, the existence of section
33 allows courts to claim that their decisions are reversible and

47

Supra note 2 at 83.

48 Arthur C. Doyle, "Silver Blaze" in The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2000) 3.
' This is due not only to the greater authority that courts command over matters that are
represented as "questions of law," but also to the fact that under the Chartercourts get to speak the
language of 'rights" while legislatures are relegated to speaking in the language of "limits"-and, in
order to invoke section 33, legislatures are required to argue that rights "do not matter." See
Jeremy Waldron, "Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct.
L. Rev. (2d) 7 at 34-39. See also Webber, "Institutional Dialogue," in Sadurski, supra note 6 at 97,
noting that constitutional rights assume "a superordinate importance, resistant to balancing," and
that any effort by legislators to influence their application is seen "as an illegitimate attempt to
impair fundamental liberties."
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therefore have democratic, as well as legal, legitimacy.5 ° This situation
nicely illustrates the extent to which the Charter privileges judicially
defined norms and places pressure on legislatures to accede to such
norms even when they are legally empowered to resist them. In this way,
it further calls into question the degree of influence attributed to
legislatures by the authors.
Far from supporting the claim that Canada has a weaker form of
judicial review, therefore, section 33 provides further grounds for
doubting this proposition. Yet all of this seems lost on the authors, who
are happy to point to section 33 as a device supporting dialogue when it
helps to bolster their thesis, while acknowledging that it is of little
practical importance when it does not.
III.

A LEGITIMATE FORM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (OR NOT)

The arguments marshalled by the authors to support their claim
that the Charterestablishes a weaker form of judicial review have not
changed significantly from those presented in 1997. The same cannot be
said, however, of their arguments in favour of the Charteis legitimacy.
Hogg and Bushell began their first article by expressing a high degree of
skepticism about traditional justifications for judicial review:
The view that the Charteris a "bad thing" is commonly based on an objection to the
legitimacy of judicial review in a democratic society. Under the Charter,judges, who are
neither elected to their offices nor accountable for their actions, are vested with the
power to strike down laws that have been made by the duly elected representatives of the
people.
The conventional answer to this objection is that all of the institutions of our society
must abide by the rule of law, and judicial review simply requires obedience by legislative
bodies to the law of the constitution. However, there is something a bit hollow and
unsatisfactory in that answer. The fact is that the law of the constitution is for the most
part couched in broad, vague language that rarely speaks definitively to the cases that
come before the courts. Accordingly, judges have a great deal of discretion in
"interpreting" the law of the constitution, and the process of interpretation inevitably
remakes the constitution into the likeness favoured by the judges. This problem has been
captured in a famous American aphorism: "We are under a Constitution, but the
Constitution is what the judges say it is."'"

soSee e.g. Vriend, supra note 7; Beverley McLachlin, "Courts, Legislatures and Executives
in the Post-Charter Era" in Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell, eds., JudicialPower and Canadian
Democracy(Montreal:McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) 63 at 68-69.
s'Supra note 2 at 76-77 [footnotes omitted].
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It was against this premise of judges exercising discretion in a manner
that reflects their own likenesses that Hogg and Bushell first presented
their case for dialogue. They supported their claim that the Charterwas
"not such a bad thing after all," not by contending that there was a
satisfactory justification for the powers given courts to decide Charter
cases (they suggested the opposite), but rather by contending that such
powers could be overcome through the capacity of legislatures to
respond to judicial decisions. Indeed, they were so confident of this
legislative capacity that they were emboldened to say that "the critique
of the Charterbasedon democratic legitimacy cannot be sustained."52
Even this overblown statement-from which they quickly
retreated 53 -cannot disguise the fact that Hogg and Bushell's original
*thesis had more to do with mitigating than legitimating the role of the
courts under the Charter. It was the asserted inability of judicial
decisions to undermine legislative democracy that, in their eyes, made
the Charter "not so bad." 54 In other words, judicial review is more
acceptable when it is less effective, and, by implication, judicial
deference is to be favoured so that courts can, as Patrick Monahan puts
it, "create the space needed to permit such dialogue to occur."5 5 It came
as no surprise, therefore, when Hogg subsequently argued that courts
should accord even greater deference to legislatures that re-enact laws
previously struck down by the courts. 6 Based on this understanding of
Hogg and Bushell's analysis, and its failure to provide a moral claim to
support or guide judges' involvement in Charter decision making, I
maintained that their thesis did not amount to a justification for judicial
review. On the contrary, by celebrating the fact that court decisions
under the Charter are ultimately less influential than is sometimes
supposed, it called into question why courts should be allowed to make
such decisions in the first place. 7
5

2 Ibid.at 105.
s Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, "Reply to 'Six Degrees of Dialogue'
Osgoode Hall L.J. 529 at 534.

(1999) 37

s'For discussion of the implications of this view for legislative democracy, see Andrew
Petter, "Look Who's Talking Now: Dialogue Theory and the Return to Democracy" in Richard W.
Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds., The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the
Constitutional State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 519.
' 5Monahan, supra note 7 at 396.
6
57
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In "CharterDialogue Revisted," the authors concede the point
that "dialogue theory does not provide a justification for judicial
review., ' At the same time, they abandon the premise of the 1997
article that the subjective nature of Charter interpretation renders
conventional theories of judicial review "hollow and unsatisfactory. 5 9
Instead, they embrace such theories with the zeal of converts, arguing
that judicial review is justified on moral, political, and legal grounds.
The moral justification, they maintain, is "the idea that individuals have
rights that must be 'taken seriously,' which means that they cannot be
taken away simply by an appeal to the general welfare."'6 In support of
this tautological assertion they cite Ronald Dworkin's 1977 book,
Taking Rights Seriously.6 The political and legal justifications they
provide are not any more original, the former referring to the
"democratic process" that gave rise to the Charter and the "popular
support" it enjoys, and the latter relying on the fact that "the Charteris
now part of the Constitution of Canada."6 All of this, of course, was
well known to Hogg and Bushell in 1997, and none of it comes close to
answering the claim made in their original article that, regardless of the
political history and legal status of. the Charter,the discretion it bestows
upon courts "inevitably remakes the constitution into the likeness
favoured by judges."'63 Moreover the reference to Dworkin is particularly
ironic for two reasons. First, his is one of the "avalanche" of "ingenious
theories to justify judicial review" that Hogg and Bushell identified with
the United States, and which they implied was neither convincing nor
required to counter anti-majoritarian objections to judicial review in
Canada.' Second, a key aspect of Dworkin's contribution to this
avalanche is his assertion that there are "right answers" to constitutional
questions, a claim that flat out contradicts Hogg and Bushell's prior
arguments.65
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6Ibid.
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6"It also contradicts the views of another Canadian proponent of dialogue theory, Kent
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This shift is significant not only because it represents a
renunciation of Hogg and Bushell's previous views, but also because it
undermines the coherence of their thesis. That thesis, it will be recalled,
was aimed at countering the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial
review. The capacity of legislatures to respond to judicial decisions was
deemed to be a "good thing" because it meant that the power of courts
to interfere with democratic decision making was diminished. This made
sense if one proceeded from Hogg and Bushell's assumption that there
was no satisfactory justification for such interference. It does not make
sense, however, if one takes the revised view of these authors and their
new co-author, Wright, that such interference is justified on other
grounds, and particularly if one takes the view that it is based on a
judicial capacity to discern "right answers." In this case, the ability of
legislatures to respond to judicial decisions with anything other than
compliance represents a potential threat to the "legitimate" values that
judicial review is designed to protect. The question of whether that
capacity is a "good thing" or a "bad thing," therefore, can only be
assessed with reference to those values, and the extent to which they are
reinforced or undermined by legislative dialogues. Yet the authors offer
no such assessment-nor could they given that, beyond asserting that
the purpose of the Charteris to take rights seriously (and the suggestion
that such values "often include the concerns of an aggrieved
minority"66 ), they provide no clue as to what Values (or minorities) it is
designed to protect, let alone what it might mean to take them seriously.
Thus by trying to remedy one problem (their lack of a
justification for judicial review), the authors have unwittingly created
another even bigger problem (the abandonment of their justification for
legislative dialogues). Further evidence of this can be found in their new
claim that dialogue theory does not militate for or against judicial
restraint, 67 and their insistence that Hogg's prior call for courts to show
increased deference to legislation re-enacted following adverse Charter
rulings "cannot be right., 6' Here we see the product of a dialogue theory

with much of that chapter devoted to questioning Dworkin's claim that right answers can be derived
from moral principles. See Roach, supra note 7 at 225-38.
ISupranote 9 at 45.
Ibid at 47.
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that has been diverted from its original mission of mitigating judicial
powers that cannot be justified, and assigned new duties mitigating
judicial powers that can be justified. Yet if such rights can be justified,
why do judicial decisions enforcing them need to be mitigated? Is it to
enable legislatures to correct judicial error? If so, some substantive
theory of rights is required to ascertain when such error has occurred. Is
it to guard against unintended disruption to legislation from justifiable
judicial decisions? If so, the legislative role is reduced to refining the
exercise of judicial power. In the reconstituted world of Charter
dialogue that the authors have created, legislatures that do more than
acquiesce to judicial decisions run the risk of thwarting Charter rights
and subjecting themselves to further judicial censure. Moreover, given
the lack of an articulated set of values to guide Charterdecision making,
legislatures have no basis for measuring the appropriateness of their
actions other than waiting for courts to tell them what they have done
wrong.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When all is said and done, the dialogue thesis advanced by the
authors appears to boil down to the unremarkable insight that
legislatures have the capacity to modify legislation following adverse
Charter rulings by the courts. Given that such modifications include
repealing provisions found to be unconstitutional by the courts and
repairing other provisions in light of such repeals, it would be much
more surprising if legislatures did not have this capacity. Nor is it
extraordinary that legislatures are often given an opportunity to
refashion legislation struck down by the courts on the basis of a meansends analysis. These and other opportunities to respond to decisions
about rights are a common feature of constitutional jurisprudence in
other jurisdictions, including the United States.
In addition to their banality, the above propositions do not tell
us much of anything about the legitimacy of judicial review. The authors
now concede that dialogue theory does not provide a justification for
judicial review. Moreover, the extent to which it answers antimajoritarian objections to judicial review can be assessed only by means
of qualitative analyses of the degree to which Charter decisions
constrain democratic policy. In this regard, Hogg's own qualitative
analysis suggests that a key feature of the Charterthat he and his coauthors maintain weakens judicial review has, in fact, had the opposite
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effect. If he is right about this, dialogue theory is further undermined.
Even if he is wrong, however, he and his co-authors have thrown
themselves on the horns of another painful dilemma by abandoning
their previous skepticism about the legitimacy of judicial review and
embracing a theory which holds that rights "cannot be taken away by an
appeal to the general welfare." How this theory can be reconciled with
one that celebrates the capacity of legislatures to reassert majoritarian
preferences through Charter dialogues-including the capacity to
override Charterrights by means of section 33-is, to put it mildly, a
mystery.
By shifting ground in this way, the authors have transformed a
thesis that was coherent but unconvincing into one that is simply
incoherent. Yet no one should think for this reason that dialogue theory
is about to loosen its hold on the constitutional imagination of Canadian
courts. As suggested by the subtitle of their article in this issue,69
dialogue theory's appeal derives more from its power as a metaphor
than its force as an argument. By portraying judicial review as a
contribution to deliberative engagement, the dialogue metaphor recasts
judges as advocates within a democratic process rather than as arbiters
within an authoritarian regime. Similarly, by representing judicial
decisions under the Charteras transitory and reversible by legislatures,
the dialogue metaphor purports to relieve judges of responsibility for
the consequences of their Charter rulings without constraining their
Charterpowers.
Given the ongoing pressure felt by courts to defend a form of
judicial review that was imposed upon them, and in the absence of a
more compelling justification for Charter decision making, it is hardly
surprising that judges would embrace a metaphor that offers them all of
this, and comes with a seal of academic approval. For these reasons,
dialogue theory will likely continue to thrive as a metaphor,
notwithstanding its deficiencies as an argument. Metaphors, it seems,
have something in common with idols. Where the need is great- and
there is a constituency that wants to believe, their capacity to engender
reverence is not impaired by their likelihood of being false.
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